From Ellen Nakashima, Washington Post: The Pentagon has approved a major expansion of its cybersecurity force over the next several years, increasing its size more than fivefold to bolster the nation’s ability to defend critical computer systems and conduct offensive computer operations against foreign adversaries, according to U.S. officials.
The move, requested by the head of the Defense Department’s Cyber Command, is part of an effort to turn an organization that has focused largely on defensive measures into the equivalent of an Internet-era fighting force. The command, made up of about 900 personnel, will expand to include 4,900 troops and civilians.
Details of the plan have not been finalized, but the decision to expand the Cyber Command was made by senior Pentagon officials late last year in recognition of a growing threat in cyberspace, said officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the expansion has not been formally announced. The gravity of that threat, they said, has been highlighted by a string of sabotage attacks, including one in which a virus was used to wipe data from more than 30,000 computers at a Saudi Arabian state oil company last summer.
WASHINGTON — The Pentagon is moving toward a major expansion of its cybersecurity force to counter increasing attacks on the nation’s computer networks, as well as to expand offensive computer operations on foreign adversaries, defense officials said Sunday.
Federal investigators looking into disclosures of classified information about a cyberoperation that targeted Iran’s nuclear program have increased pressure on current and former senior government officials suspected of involvement, according to people familiar with the investigation.
The inquiry, which was started by Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. last June, is examining leaks about a computer virus developed jointly by the United States and Israel that damaged nuclear centrifuges at Iran’s primary uranium enrichment plant. The U.S. code name for the operation was Olympic Games, but the wider world knew the mysterious computer worm as Stuxnet.
Much of what is written today about the capabilities required by the military services is offered within the context of fiscal restraint, national budget austerity, and cuts in the defense budget to ensure that the armed services pay their “fair” share of deficit reduction. This study argues for building an Air Force to support a joint force that can meet current and future threats to American security without regard for arbitrary fiscal guidelines and ceilings. It is time for the United States to adopt an asymmetric strategy linking objectives and resources, emphasizing the role of air power, and maximizing U.S. Air Force contributions to that strategy.
My SSQ article is one of the references....
WASHINGTON - The nation's top military leaders warned Congress in unusually stark terms that its failure to pass a 2013 defense budget - coupled with the threat of automatic budget cuts - has pushed the Pentagon to the brink of a crisis.
They wrote in a joint letter to congressional leaders that the readiness of U.S. armed forces is at a "tipping point."
A copy of the letter was provided Wednesday to The Associated Press.
The military leaders said that troops in combat and those who are being treated for wounds will get the funds needed. But the rest of the force will be severely compromised if the Pentagon has to continue operating on last year's budget.
"We are on the brink of creating a hollow force," said the letter signed by the chiefs of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and National Guard, as well as the chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Return of Dr. Strangelove
By Jan Kallberg & Adam Lowther, the Diplomat, August 20, 2012
How fiscal austerity will push the United States towards nuclear arms and cyber-warfare. With the prospect of sequestration looming, the United States may find itself increasingly relying on nuclear and cyber deterrence as an affordable means of guaranteeing national sovereignty and preventing major conflict between the U.S. and potential adversaries in the Asia-Pacific. While earlier defense planning and acquisition were based on economic conditions that no longer exist, Congress’s options to balance the budget by cutting defense spending are politically palatable because far fewer American are “defense voters” relative to “social welfare voters,” according to a number of recent public opinion surveys.
The simple fact is China’s rise has yet to present a clear danger to American interests in the minds of most Americans.
The first steps in this process are already underway and exemplified by the administration’s new strategy – published in January 2012. When the official requirement that the Department of Defense (DoD) be able to fight two major wars simultaneously disappeared, an opportunity to downsize the armed forces presented itself. From Congress’s viewpoint, the budget crisis must be solved without unseating its members. Ironically, austerity may cause Americans to stop worrying about a hypothetical rogue detonation and learn to love the bomb. Dr. Strangelove may return with a vengeance, but this time with a cyber doomsday device under one arm and its nuclear counterpart under the other.
After all, dollar for dollar, nuclear weapons—in particular—provide American taxpayers the greatest level of security and stability of any weapon the nation has ever fielded. The fact that at an estimated $30 billion per year—5% of the defense budget—the nuclear arsenal is cheap, may spur Congress to take a pragmatic position toward the nation’s most powerful military capabilities (as the federal budget is increasingly engulfed by social welfare programs) and support an effective nuclear deterrent along with the development of devastating cyber capabilities. It is important to keep in mind that both areas—nuclear and cyber—are a primary focus of Chinese military developments. Failing to maintain an advantage in both may prove unwise for the United States. Some in the scientific community argue that this perspective is unrealistic. Politics, being what they are, is all about getting elected; complex strategic calculations in the Asia-Pacific offer little comfort during a tough reelection fight that is focused on the domestic economy.
With Congress having a number of incumbents whose constituencies loathe the thought of cuts to Medicare, Medicaid, Veterans’ benefits, and Social Security, taking greater risks in national security is a more tangible option. As the nation borrows over $1 trillion per year, the quest to balance the budget is impossible without dramatic spending cuts given the unacceptability of tax increases. The nation’s deficit crisis may soon turn the United States’ geopolitical posture from one that is ideologically based on global interventionism—popular with both Republicans and Democrats—to one more akin to defense non-intervention. While international trade will continue and expand, the United States may cease to be a shining city upon a hill and the global policeman.
It is somewhat paradoxical that after the country demonstrated overwhelming conventional superiority in the last two wars—Afghanistan and Iraq—the cost of that capability may lead to a renaissance of nuclear deterrence and the development of cyber deterrence as a strategic policy, a move that may be more useful in an “Asia-Pacific century” than many realize.
In comparison to large conventional forces and the decades of veteran’s benefits that follow, the nuclear arsenal is far more affordable over the long term. Cyber is also more cost effective when it comes to R&D and expensive acquisition programs. With a per-unit price estimated at about $4 billion, a new Ohio-class-replacing nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN-X) can produce strategic deterrence for less than an army division of 10,000 career soldiers whose compensation―with pensions and benefits―continues for an additional 40 years after these soldiers have served.
A key policy driver in coming years may prove to be the limited costs of upgrading and maintaining existing nuclear weapons when a cash-strapped federal government seeks to reduce the deficit. Maintaining and upgrading existing nuclear weapon systems is inexpensive by comparison. Even if nuclear weapons are bound―as Kenneth N. Waltz states―to make people uneasy because of their immense destructive power, nuclear arms may prove to be a budgetary emergency exit.
For many Americans, Peter Sellers’s portrayal of nuclear deterrence policies in the 1950s and 1960s remains a reality. While Dr. Strangelove (1964) is an iconic film, its black comedy addressed the dangers of nuclear weapons, doomsday devices, missile gaps, and the intricate webs of deterrence and geopolitics of a bygone era where the world was still coming to grips with the destructive power of “the bomb.” In one scene, Dr. Strangelove carefully explains for the president deterrence and the doomsday device saying, “Mr. President, it is not only possible, it is essential. That is the whole idea of this machine, you know. Deterrence is the art of producing in the mind of the enemy the fear to attack.” Admittedly, this psychological aspect has not changed, but technology and operational experience have made nuclear weapons a safe and secure means of deterring conventional and nuclear attack, which may prove critically important in deterring an increasingly assertive China.
It is cyber deterrence that is in a similar position to where nuclear deterrence was at the time of Dr. Strangelove. After a generation of neglect, deterrence, in its broadest meaning, is experiencing an overdue renaissance among scholars and policy wonks. For those advocates of nuclear zero who thought conventional precision attack would serve as a panacea for the nation’s security challenges, the past twenty years were a disappointment. They failed to deter a number of adversaries America has fought over the last two decades.
Most importantly, they have proven all too expensive and are not deterring a rising China, a resurgent Russia, or an unpredictable North Korea. Budgetary Realities Despite disengaging from Iraq and the start of reductions in Afghanistan, the federal budget has a trillion dollar plus deficit. And with the 2012 defense and national security budgets equaling 63% of discretionary spending, cuts are likely to come to defense many times in the future. Cuts of 25% or more have an historical precedent and the examples that exist where the warfare and welfare state collide are inevitably won by the welfare state Dwindling Conventional Forces Policymakers are realizing there is a limited return on investment when using a counterinsurgency (COIN) military strategy to occupy foreign countries.
Two schools of thought in national security have been vying for preeminence in the post-Vietnam era. The First, as embodied by the Weinberger Doctrine, suggests that the U.S. should only employ military force in conflicts with: an expected outcome, a given duration, public support, and where vital national interests are at stake. In short, realism is seeking to reassert itself. In such a way of thinking, there are no proverbial land wars in Asia. The second and, at least within the Beltway, more dominant view advocates employing economic and military power to accelerate the inevitable expansion of democracy. President Bill Clinton’s globalization and President George W. Bush’s doctrine of preemption are two sides of the same coin. This latter school of thought gave Americans Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo during the 1990s and Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s. While the nation’s military took an “acquisition holiday” during the 1990s, the 2000s saw defense spending increase dramatically in an effort to fight two wars. And while the Iraq war is over and Afghanistan is winding down, the bill for replacing the nation’s worn-out aircraft and ships is leaving Congress with sticker shock. Personnel are also an expensive asset. With the largest number of personnel, the Army represents a third of defense costs.
It is likely that the nation’s occupation force will be the prime target for reduction in size and capability and rightfully so. It was the Army that grew by almost 20% to meet the demands of Iraq, and it is the Army that should shrink in its aftermath. This is not an issue of inter-service rivalry, but a question of shifting strategic threats. The Marine Corps also grew during the 2000s and must also return to pre-conflict levels. For the Navy and the Air Force, the past decade was a hard time because acquisition dollars went to fight the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq instead. Absent the services and the DoD finding a way to bring down acquisition costs, this decade may prove even tougher as defense spending is increasingly squeezed by entitlement growth. With all of the previous doom and gloom assessments, realist advocates of the nuclear arsenal have an opportunity to offer a different and more cost effective vision for national security, but it must include cyber.
First, and most importantly, they must overcome Washington’s predilection toward costly action and offer a compelling case for restraint on a grand scale. By in large, China has given the United States a model for such restraint—thus far. Second, they must move beyond nuclear deterrence and offer a full spectrum of deterrence options, with cyber deterrence the central addition. Cyber Deterrence Had Dr. Strangelove been an advisor and scientist in today’s Department of Defense, it is certain that cyber deterrence would play a central role in his deterrence thinking. With cyberspace all the rage within the national security community, it should come as no surprise that cyber deterrence is a rapidly developing area of opportunity. While cyber weapons lack digital lethality (so far), the ability to kill other systems and create havoc in an adversary’s society—with significant human suffering as a side effect— creates the potential to deter an adversary. Deterrence is built on the certainty that a response to one’s actions will outweigh the potential gains of taking those actions. While it is true that cyber weapons have yet presented a visible threat of mass destruction—as nuclear and conventional arms have—this is changing. It is important to understand both the options embedded in cyber deterrence and the actions that are feasible.
Cyber weapons have global reach at a limited cost, but questions remain about their actual lethality and attribution. After the Stuxnet attack in which malicious code entered the computer networks of the Iranian nuclear program and physically destroyed equipment by manipulating operating speeds, the legal community started a review of cyber weapons. According to some international legal theorists, there was no control over where, how, and when Stuxnet proliferated in computer systems. Therefore, it was assumed that it could create civilian harm and in doing so would become illegal by international law standards. A combination of the absence of destructive power and the soon-established precedence that cyber weapons are not precise military targets and, therefore, in conflict with international law, erode the opportunity of replacing conventional deterrence with cyber deterrence preparing the way for further reliance on nuclear deterrence.
Thus, cyber deterrence is in need of significant development. This is particularly important because of the vast penetration of American private and public sector networks originating from China. Thus far, the United States has found no effective way to deter such attacks. Nuclear Deterrence In the coming decades, nuclear arms can play a greater role in comparison to the last two decades. They are the only weapons that project power from Montana to Macau simultaneously, without moving military hardware or personnel. Political theorist Kenneth N. Waltz argued that the power of nuclear arms lies in not what you do with them, but what you can do; an argument he was not alone in making. Under severe budgetary pressures, nuclear arms maintain the nation as a great power regardless of economic, cultural, or other influence—a point the Chinese, North Koreans, and Russians understand well. This reasoning also led the United Kingdom to make building nuclear-capable submarines a priority, even after the deepest defense cuts since the post-World War II drawdown. Reliance on nuclear arms to maintain geopolitical equilibrium is visible in Siberia and Russia’s Far East, where a resource-rich wilderness borders a resource-craving China. Russia’s ability to defend and uphold the territorial sovereignty of its Far East relies heavily on nuclear arms. Nuclear arms are returning as a tool of power—even if incrementally.
Austerity and extensive defense budget cuts are triggering renewed interest in the nuclear triad. While the price of boomers, bombers, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) may seem relatively high, at less than 10% of the defense budget, both figuratively and literally they offer the greatest bang for the buck. Nuclear submarines project awe-inspiring and stealthy power beyond the force any armored division or army corps can ever achieve. Bombers allow the president to signal adversaries in a way submarines and missiles cannot. ICBMs increase the threshold for launching an attack against the United States by forcing an adversary to attack the homeland should they seek to destroy our ability to return fire. While the triad may, at first glance, have appeared expensive and outdated after the Cold War, a fiscally constrained military that seeks to maintain stability across the globe requires a robust arsenal as means to preventing great powers from beginning and/or escalating conflicts that could go nuclear. In short, they deter and limit great power conflicts, which have proven costly for the United States. Affordable Deterrence The United States has no other option than to seek innovative ways to decrease defense costs without losing deterrent power and risking national security.
Henry Kissinger once argued that “The absence of alternatives clears the mind marvelously.” The future of American deterrence will be connected to affordability. After the era of endless money, as Robert Gates calls the years after 9/11, there are tough decisions to make at the start of the Asia-Pacific century. Even if defense cuts are imminent, there are several advantages for the U.S. that can be exploited to achieve affordable defense; the nuclear arsenal being the most important one. Despite advances in technology the U.S. still enjoys geopolitical advantages. For example, the Pacific and Atlantic oceans protect the country from a variety of conventional military threats. In comparison to other nations, the country is safe geopolitically. The cost to defend the homeland is far less than conducting large-scale, counterinsurgency operations in remote countries—invade, occupy, and rebuild. In general, neighbors to both north and south are friendly. From a long-term financial viewpoint, defense focused on the American homeland requires a smaller land force in comparison to the present one. With deterrence, intelligence, and the ability to intercept incoming aircraft or missiles enabled by systems that are capital intensive and sophisticated, fewer personnel are required to defend the homeland and protect American interests in Asia.
According to Waltz, deterrence is what you can do, not what you will do. Throughout history, adversaries have taken steps toward each other that escalated quickly because they underestimated the options and determination of the other based on the presence of resources of war at hand. Because of this, it is important that America is clear about its intentions and capability. The United States is the only nation that has used nuclear arms at war when it eradicated two Japanese cities at the end of World War II. None have yet to employ the nuclear option—an all-out attack, in cyberspace. America is, after all, the only nation that has used nuclear weapons—credibility that should not be frittered away.
For any potential adversary, it is a lethal fact. America are likely able in near time to create disproportional digital exploitation responses (DDER) to any power that crosses the line and challenge U.S. cyber supremacy with significant destabilizing effect on the targeted society. It might not color the minds of the current American leadership, but it influences foreign leaders. Deterrence relies upon will and capability. If the United States can no longer deter with conventional forces; international sanctions are ineffective; and coalition building is beyond others’ financial reach; nuclear deterrence becomes the primary upholder of strategic deterrence. When austerity removes other strategically deterring options and the United States is left with nuclear deterrence,
Dr. Strangelove and his doomsday machines (cyber and nuclear) can make their triumphal return.America’s ability and willingness to wage all-out war is validated by strategic deterrent patrols, bombers sitting on alert, launch-ready missiles, and an offensive cyber-Armageddon capability. With these assets ready to reach global targets, deterrence can be successful. No matter whether we want it, believe it, like it, or imagine it, federal austerity will force radical change in the nation’s defense posture, which is likely to lead to a greater reliance on nuclear and cyber arms. Succeeding in Asia will depend upon the United States realizing its position sooner rather than later.
In the 1930s, B.H. Liddell Hart, Giffard Le Quesne Martel, and John F.C. Fuller wrote extensively about the future of mobile warfare. Martel was considered one of the world’s leading tank experts of the 1930s. He went so far to prove his case that he built a light tank in his own garden, at his own expense, which became the platform for the British Bren gun-carrier.
Apparently it was still legal in the 1930s to build you own tank behind the garage in a suburbian neighborhood....
The Lure of Traditional Thinking
The cyber warfare concepts and abilities of the early years will continue to evolve over the decades to come. Developments tend to take longer than first anticipated not only because of technological hindrances, but also due to a path-dependent culture favoring earlier methods and a natural instinct to prefer what is known. There is a valid analogy between the dawn of cyber warfare and the dawn of armored warfare. It took 25 years for Western armies to figure out a proper use for the armored tank. Once that was understood, the way wars were fought was fundamentally changed. That has continued for 70 years and still counting.
For the first 25 years, the French and British saw the battle tank as a moveable machinegun pillbox from trench warfare. The tank was not a fighting platform; it was a mobile fortification that supported infantry. This perception changed when those countries suffered a horrifying defeat to the Germans in May 1940; the Germans had studied, developed, and understood armored warfare. For the Allied forces, it was too late; the damage was done. The irony is not only that the French developed many of the ideas the Germans utilized, such as Charles de Gaulle’s proposed armored warfare tactics and the French airmen’s innovation of advanced dive-bombing, but also that the Allies publically and vocally debated the opportunities these tactical innovations offered. The Germans were listening, but not the Allied high command. Due to groupthink and intellectual path dependency, the French military never accepted it or even considered it seriously.
The French preferred structured positional warfare. An integral part of positional warfare was fighting for fixed hardened positions—a war of holding positions and attrition. In 1940, France had the largest land army and also the largest number of battle tanks in Western Europe. In addition, there were Allied forces such as the British Expeditionary Force.
The difference between the combatants was the tactics of how to use battle tanks. The German strategy—which was old and known to the French—was an attempt to encircle the French after a breakthrough, but the tactics and operational performance were revolutionary. The German tanks were in the hands of Heinz Guderian, who carefully studied how to utilize tanks in an unconventional manner. He invented and refined armored warfare, ensuring that he could exploit the adversary’s weaknesses. The number of French tanks and massive French army did not matter. The reason was simple: the French were not able in their minds to fight modern warfare and therefore were doomed to destruction or submission.
Guderian utilized the embedded abilities of armored units. The Germans changed the aim point, and instead of racing toward Paris through Belgium, the armored units pushed toward the Atlantic Coast to cut off the Allied forces in Flanders and Belgium where they waited for a repeat of the attack of 1914. The Sichelschnitt Plan of 1940 was designed for armored warfare; it had momentum and speed and captured the initiative. Once executed by the Germans, the French line of defense collapsed. After the Blitzkrieg of 1940, Guderian wrote about his preparation:
For someone observing tank theory from afar, unburdened by tradition, there were lessons to be learned in the employment, organization and construction of armor and of armored units that went beyond the doctrines then accepted abroad. After years of hard struggle, I had succeeded in putting my theories into practice before the other armies had arrived at the same conclusions. The advance we had made in the organization and employment of tanks was the primary factor on which my belief in our forthcoming success was based.7
The opportunity in cyber operations in the next decade is not a revolutionary technology, but instead derives from how we utilize and militarize existing technologies in a way that is unburdened by tradition, to use Guderian’s words.
The French in 1940 were still thinking of warfare as a solid front between two adversaries, consisting of three lines of units: infantry, artillery, and bakery. The traditional way of fighting war was that infantry faced and fought the enemy, artillery supported the infantry with indirect fire, and the rear echelon, here called bakery, provided logistic support. Guderian broke the rules and fought the war in reverse order. He concentrated his units and overran the French lines at a weak point, and in a deep stroke attacked the bakery, ignored the infantry, and let the artillery panic. The attack was identical to the sketches of deep-penetrating armored assaults that Liddell Hart and de Gaulle envisioned before the war.
The lure in applying traditional military thinking on cyber warfare is that we can fight cyberwar based on the doctrines and intellectual underpinnings of land battle as we know it. Carl von Clausewitz assumed that the soil, woods, heights, and rivers of the Napoleonic battlefield were fixed. In a Clausewitzian world, the battle commander could understand and study the battlefield, and by objective permanence, the intended battlefield would be there the next day ready for battle. The woods would not move, the rivers would not disappear, and the heights would not sink. In cyber, the map and terrain that form the battlespace change continuously in real time and beyond our imagination as new nodes are discovered and a kaleidoscope of network patterns occurs and disappears. Traditional military theories could be less relevant in cyberspace than we are ready to admit. Traditional thinking appeals to us, but it could be spurious.
If we assume that we have control of the situation and knowledge of our enemy’s positions and the full extent of the map, with our defense focused on hardened strongpoints, then we are fighting the digital cyberwar with the tools of analogue positional warfare. Edward N. Luttwak noted that strategy only matters if we have the resources to execute the strategy, and embedded in Luttwak’s statement is the general condition that if we are unable to identify, understand, and utilize our resources, strategy does not matter.
Cyber supremacy will be achieved if we can understand the unique tenets of cyber, create a doctrine that exploits opportunity and technical ability, achieve broad societal alignment to cyber strategy, and assemble the workforce to execute it. Universities play a vital part in the last three components. Even if the military develops the brightest and most thought-through doctrine ever conceived, it will still be only a doctrine and nothing more. Doctrines are instruments of war, but they tell only how to play the cards; the actual deck of cards in cyberwar is mainly produced by private enterprises and academia.
Ill prepared, ill suited and irrelevant — that’s the conclusion a new report on Britain’s cyber defences. In a scathing analysis, the House of Commons Defence Committee’s demands the government take the cyber threat more seriously:
‘The Government needs to put in place — as it has not yet done — mechanisms, people, education, skills, thinking and policies which take it into both the opportunities, and the vulnerable, which cyber presents. It is time the government approached this subject with vigour.’
The picture is funny - the actors participated in a comedy show about a group over over-ambitious home guard volunteer during the early days of WW2 in 1940. Hilarious show.
Research Development is a set of strategic, proactive, catalytic, and capacity-building activities designed to facilitate individual faculty members, teams of researchers, and central research administration in attracting extramural research funding, creating relationships, and developing and implementing strategies that increase institutional competitiveness.
Texas A&M have a really nice sub-website about research - and funding.
The founding principle of the Journal of Universal Rejection (JofUR) is rejection. Universal rejection. That is to say, all submissions, regardless of quality, will be rejected. Despite that apparent drawback, here are a number of reasons you may choose to submit to the JofUR:
You can send your manuscript here without suffering waves of anxiety regarding the eventual fate of your submission. You know with 100% certainty that it will not be accepted for publication. There are no page-fees. You may claim to have submitted to the most prestigious journal (judged by acceptance rate). The JofUR is one-of-a-kind. Merely submitting work to it may be considered a badge of honor. You retain complete rights to your work, and are free to resubmit to other journals even before our review process is complete. Decisions are often (though not always) rendered within hours of submission.
General William Shelton, commander of the US Air Force Space Command, told reporters in a press briefing for the Defense Writers Group that he believes Iran's growing "cyber" capabilities will be a "force to be reckoned with," thanks in part to Iran's response to the Stuxnet attacks on its nuclear facilities in 2010.
"It's clear that the Natanz situation generated reaction by them," Shelton told reporters, referring to the nuclear facility where Stuxnet crippled centrifuges. "They are going to be a force to be reckoned with, with the potential capabilities that they will develop over the years and the potential threat that will represent to the United States."
Shelton, who oversees the Air Force's own cyberwarfare operations, the 24th Air Force, is pushing for more expansion of Air Force communications. Current plans from the Defense Department's Cyber Command—the joint command responsible for coordinating the military's offensive and defensive network operations—call for an additional 1,000 civilian employees to the Air Force's network operations and security workforce over the next two years. The Air Force's "cyber professionals" currently number about 6,000.
Security analysts are predicting that 2013 is when nation-sponsored cyberwarfare goes mainstream -- and some think such attacks will lead to actual deaths.
In 2012, large-scale cyberattacks targeted at the Iranian government were uncovered, and in return, Iran is believed to have launched massive attacks aimed at U.S. banks and Saudi oil companies. At least 12 of the world's 15 largest military powers are currently building cyberwarfare programs, according to James Lewis, a cybersecurity expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
The Navy wants to build unmanned platforms that it can place in the depths of the the world’s oceans to have them float to the surface when the military needs the supplies or equipment stored within them.
It sounds almost like the plot from a movie like the Transformers. Machines rising from the bottoms of the oceans to attack the world’s citizens. However, this effort isn’t science fiction.
Nu har vi ”Genderforce” – Genusstyrkan som en ny beståndsdel i den svenska Försvarsmakten, något som vi kanske kan exportera till något annat land med samma militära prioriteringar som Sverige – där det är viktigare om generalen eller amiralen har snippa istället för snopp än att man kan slåss. Försvarsminister Enströms prioriteringar visade sig tydligt idag när hon ventilerade sitt missnöje med Försvarsmakten – och då när det handlade om jämställdhet och inte allt det där andra som många av oss andra är missnöjda med.
De nya Moderaternas försvarspolitik bekänner färg igen och igen och igen. Som Anders Björck konstaterade häromdagen så lär salig Bohman snurra som en torktumlare i sin grav uppe på Rådmansö om hanses ande kan hålla koll på de moderata försvarsturerna utan att upplösas i förtvivlan. Av de gamla Moderaternas försvarspolitik finns bara vackra minnen, minnen om ett parti som tog försvaret på allvar…
Tillåt mig asgarva....
If the United States does not aggressively pursue comprehensive cyber superiority, competitors and enemies will. Larger budgets reflect this understanding. Cyber defense research teams will be needed at universities that are able to break down barriers among departments and schools and combine all their resources to establish cohesive cyber defense, as opposed to indulging the turf war mentality and other retardants. The aim must be actionable ideas and not just theory. A survey has found a disconnect between most research conducted and real Defense Department needs. Funds must be steered to institutions that transcend parochial issues and offer the Armed Forces and Intelligence Community more choices and include political theory, behavioral psychology, international law, international relations, and other relevant areas.
Cervenka: Verkligheten hann ikapp
Skuldkrisen tog form på bara ett par år, men i dagens hyperaktiva värld är det lätt att förlora känslan för dramatiken. Andreas Cervenka sammanfattar året då verkligheten hann ikapp.
The Russian defense ministry says its the “first time in decades” it’s launched naval exercises on this scale. The drills involve warships from all of Russia’s fleets: “the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific,” noted a statement from the ministry. The exercise will be reportedly held in late January, and involve amphibious landings in the Caucasus and naval exercises in the Mediterranean.
Gotland är oförsvarat. Ad notam.