Jan Kallberg, PhD

Pentagon Five-Year Cybersecurity Plan Seeks $23 Billion - Bloomberg

A Pentagon cybersecurity budget outline calls for spending almost $23 billion through fiscal 2018, as efforts are expanded on initiatives from protecting computer networks to developing offensive capabilities.

The Defense Department already has proposed $4.65 billion for such programs in the fiscal year that begins Oct. 1, an 18 percent increase from the $3.94 billion budgeted this year. The five-year “cyber-expense” budget obtained by Bloomberg News calls for spending to remain elevated from past levels.

via www.bloomberg.com

IEEE Xplore - State Actors' Offensive Cyberoperations: The Disruptive Power of Systematic Cyberattacks

Browse Journals & Magazines > IT Professional ...> Volume:15 Issue:3

State Actors' Offensive Cyberoperations: The Disruptive Power of Systematic Cyberattacks

via ieeexplore.ieee.org

During the last few years, several nation states have entered cyberspace in an attempt to use the Internet for policy, geopolitical, and state gains. Using development of the battle tank as an analogy, the authors explore the militarization of the Internet and how the ability to think beyond the existing cybersecurity paradigm has led to new cyberweapons and the need for new defensive strategies. The existing paradigm says that cyberspace is becoming more secure; the entrance of state actors reverses this trajectory, making cyberspace less secure and heavily contested.

China's Cyber Attacks Threaten Social Order: Analyst | Defense Tech

The U.S. president should tell the leader of China’s communist party that its cyber attacks against Western targets threaten to undermine the Chinese economy and social order, an analyst said.

When asked what President Barack Obama should say to President Xi Jinping at their next meeting in June, James Mulvenon, a vice president at Defense Group Inc., a technology company in Vienna, Va., was blunt.

“This is imperiling your own economic development, which is imperiling your social stability, which is your No. 1 priority,” Mulvenon said May 21 during a panel discussion at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank in Washington, D.C. “The only message that will get through to a general secretary of the Chinese communist party is that economic development and social stability are threatened by the brazen scope and scale of this intrusion.”

via defensetech.org

http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=18321

http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=18321.

The U.S. military does not believe its soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines should be engaged in combat with adversaries on a "level playing field." Our combat individuals enter engagements to win. To that end, the United States has used its technical prowess and industrial capability to develop decisive weapons that overmatch those of potential enemies. In its current engagement—what has been identified as an "era of persistent conflict"— the nation's most important weapon is the dismounted soldier operating in small units. Today's soldier must be prepared to contend with both regular and irregular adversaries. Results in Iraq and Afghanistan show that, while the U.S. soldier is a formidable fighter, the contemporary suite of equipment and support does not afford the same high degree of overmatch capability exhibited by large weapons platforms—yet it is the soldier who ultimately will play the decisive role in restoring stability.

Making the Soldier Decisive on Future Battlefields establishes the technical requirements for overmatch capability for dismounted soldiers operating individually or in small units. It prescribes technological and organizational capabilities needed to make the dismounted soldier a decisive weapon in a changing, uncertain, and complex future environment and provides the Army with 15 recommendations on how to focus its efforts to enable the soldier and tactical small unit (TSU) to achieve overmatch.

Op-Ed: Downsizing the Army Profession

 John Carpenter, film director of horror movies such as Halloween, was once asked what he thought it was that scared theater audiences the most. His answer was simple: “Uncertainty.” Carpenter understood that not knowing what will happen next often produces more anxiety and angst than actual traumatic events. As anyone who has sat on the edge of their chair during thrillers such as Psycho or Jaws understands, it’s the apprehension and dread resulting from uncertainty that exacts the most psychological toll from viewers. 

      Unfortunately, today’s Army finds itself reading from a script saturated with uncertainty. For a force accustomed to the draining yet preordained forecasts of the “Patch Chart” and the frenetic yet predictable pace of the ARFORGEN cycle, the end of the war in Afghanistan signals the beginning of a journey into the unknown. Soldiers—many of whom have known nothing but the Groundhog Day routine of deploying or preparing to deploy—now find themselves in an Army with undefined budgetary conditions and a still evolving mission.

via www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil

USAF Makes Raidrs System More Permanent

The U.S. Air Force has been quietly developing and has finally fielded a permanent solution to protect its crucial satellite communications signals from interference, hostile or otherwise.

Brig. Gen. Roger Teague, Air Force Space Command’s strategic planner, noted during a speech at the 29th National Space Symposium earlier this month that the Rapid Attack Identification Detection Reporting System (Raidrs) is fielded — one of several accomplishments for the command in 2012. Raidrs is designed for “defensive counterspace,” or protecting satellite communications links by alerting operators to anomalies in signals in the C, Ku, X and UHF frequencies.

A Raidrs prototype, designed by Integral Systems of Lanham, Md., was in use in the Middle East since July 2005. The system included a series of antennas that could be used to locate an ellipsis of area where a jamming source could be located. Those antennas were deployed forward in U.S. Central Command and require protection.

But they proved the concept of monitoring satellite communications signals and detecting the source of interference. This mission has become more crucial as U.S. forces have been more dispersed through the battlefield and reliant on satellite communications. Because the military’s communications have inherent protection, Raidrs is focused on monitoring commercial satellite signals from the geosynchronous belt. The military relies heavily on these systems for operations abroad.

Now, however, the Air Force has fielded a more permanent system. The service now has a centralized operations center at Peterson AFB, Colo. Five transportable Raidrs Transportable Ground Segments (RTGS) are being strategically located at the following locations: Lualualei Naval Station, Hawaii; Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Fla.; Misawa Air Base, Japan; Kapaun Air Station, Germany and an unidentified location in Central Command. “By placing on RTGS in Japan and another in Hawaii, we can monitor signals for [electro-magnetic interference] throughout the Pacific region,” according to a command spokeswoman.

No additional Raidrs procurements are planned.

via www.aviationweek.com

A system that would pick up anomalies I think is a big leap forward.

Air Force reclassification of cyber tools as weapons sparks speculation - CSO Online - Security and Risk

pril 12, 2013 — CSO — An Air Force general this week stoked speculation about the military's cyberwar preparedness when he revealed it had reclassified six cyber tools as weapons.

Reclassifying the tools -- which weren't explained in any detail -- will enable their programs to more effectively compete for scarce funds in the Defense Department's budget, reasoned Lt. Gen. John Hyten, vice commander of the Air Force Space Command.

The move would help "normalize" military cyber operations, said Hyten at a cyber conference held in conjunction with the National Space Symposium in Colorado Springs, Reuters reported. It will also help cyber capabilities "get more attention and the recognition [they deserve]," he added.

via www.csoonline.com

ScienceDirect.com - Strategic Intelligence Management - Chapter 19 - From Cyber Terrorism to State Actors’ Covert Cyber Operations

Abstracts:

Historically, since the Internet started to become a common feature in our lives, hackers have been seen as a major threat. This view has repeatedly been entrenched and distributed by media coverage and commentaries through the years. Instead the first 20 years of the Internet was acceptably secure due to the limited abilities of the attackers, compared to the threat generated from a militarized Internet with state actors conducting cyber operations. In reality, the Internet has a reversed trajectory for its security; it has become more unsafe over time and moved from a threat to the individual to a national security threat. The entry of state actors creates a contested cyberspace where intelligence, economic espionage, information operations, and psychological operations radically changed the fundamentals for Internet security. The state actor seeks to exploit weaknesses in the targeted national infrastructure, industrial base's connection to the global networked grid, and take advantage of the fact that our populations heavily rely on the Internet. The aggressive state actor has an advantage in cyberspace due to the weaknesses in attribution, which work as a standing invite to conduct proxy wars, utilizing criminal networks or aligned political groups, to carry out the attacks with little risk for detection. This requires a modified view on cyberspace role in national security.

via www.sciencedirect.com

Chapter 19 – From Cyber Terrorism to State Actors’ Covert Cyber Operations
Jan Kallberg, Bhavani Thuraisingham
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-407191-9.00019-3, How to Cite or Link Using DOI
Permissions & Reprints

ScienceDirect.com - Strategic Intelligence Management - Chapter 19 - From Cyber Terrorism to State Actors’ Covert Cyber Operations

Chapter 19 – From Cyber Terrorism to State Actors’ Covert Cyber Operations

• Jan Kallberg,
• Bhavani Thuraisingham

Available online 26 February 2013

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-407191-9.00019-3, How to Cite or Link Using DOI

• Permissions & Reprints

via www.sciencedirect.com

Abstracts:
Historically, since the Internet started to become a common feature in our lives, hackers have been seen as a major threat. This view has repeatedly been entrenched and distributed by media coverage and commentaries through the years. Instead the first 20 years of the Internet was acceptably secure due to the limited abilities of the attackers, compared to the threat generated from a militarized Internet with state actors conducting cyber operations. In reality, the Internet has a reversed trajectory for its security; it has become more unsafe over time and moved from a threat to the individual to a national security threat. The entry of state actors creates a contested cyberspace where intelligence, economic espionage, information operations, and psychological operations radically changed the fundamentals for Internet security. The state actor seeks to exploit weaknesses in the targeted national infrastructure, industrial base's connection to the global networked grid, and take advantage of the fact that our populations heavily rely on the Internet. The aggressive state actor has an advantage in cyberspace due to the weaknesses in attribution, which work as a standing invite to conduct proxy wars, utilizing criminal networks or aligned political groups, to carry out the attacks with little risk for detection. This requires a modified view on cyberspace role in national security.

ScienceDirect.com - Strategic Intelligence Management - Chapter 19 - From Cyber Terrorism to State Actors’ Covert Cyber Operations

Strategic Intelligence Management

National Security Imperatives and Information and Communications Technologies

2013, Pages 229–233

Edited By Babak Akhgar and Simeon Yates

Chapter 19 – From Cyber Terrorism to State Actors’ Covert Cyber Operations

• Jan Kallberg,
• Bhavani Thuraisingham

Available online 26 February 2013

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-407191-9.00019-3, How to Cite or Link Using DOI

• Permissions & Reprints

via www.sciencedirect.com

Strategic Intelligence Management - 9780124071919|ScienceDirect.com

 

Chapter 19 - From Cyber Terrorism to State Actors’ Covert Cyber Operations

, Pages 229-233, Jan Kallberg, Bhavani Thuraisingham

 Show preview  |   Related articles  |  Related reference work articles    

via www.sciencedirect.com

Jan Kallberg | University of Texas at Dallas | Cyber Defense, Defensive Counter Cyber | Researcher, CySREC, Erik Jonsson School of Engineering and Computer Science, The University of Texas at Dallas

Over 15 years experience in cyber security and been actively thinking about how a contested and militarized cyberspace would develop for over a decade. 

See personal page: http://www.cyberdefense.com (registered 1996) 

Main Research Direction: Cyber Operations, Cyber Operations Integration in National Security, Strategic Deterrence, Cyber Warfare, Cyber Strategies, National Security,
Deterrence  

Minor research interest: Public Transparency, Open Government, Public Leadership, Government in an Era of Austerity 

Structured as research directions: • Research Direction 1: Cyber Operations, Cyber Operations Integration in National Security, Offensive Cyber, Counter Cyber, Sensitive
Intelligence, Strategic Deterrence, Cyber Warfare, Policy Options in Cyber Operations, Cyber Strategies 

• Research Direction 2: Information Assurance, Trust, Defensive Counter Cyber Operations, Environmental Long-Range Effects of Failed Cyberdefense 

• Research Direction 3: Public Transparency, Open Government, Public Leadership, Societal Trust 

Cyber Operations

  PDF

Cyber Operations Bridging from Concept to Cyber Superiority (with Bhavani Thuraisingham), Joint Forces Quarterly (2013)

The United States is preparing for cyber conflicts and ushering in a new era for...

 

  PDF

Designer Satellite Collisions from Covert Cyber War, Strategic Studies Quarterly (2012)

Outer space has enjoyed two decades of fairly peaceful development since the Cold War, but...

 

Cyber Operations in Space

  PDF

Designer Satellite Collisions from Covert Cyber War, Strategic Studies Quarterly (2012)

Outer space has enjoyed two decades of fairly peaceful development since the Cold War, but...

 

Cyber and Nuclear Deterrence

  PDF

The Return of Dr. Strangelove: How austerity makes us stop worrying and love the bomb…and cyber war

via works.bepress.com

Related articles

JFQ-68: Cyber Operations: Bridging from Concept to Cyber Superiority

Conflict and Cooperation in Cyberspace: The Challenge to National Security (Hardback) - Taylor & Francis

The Return of Dr. Strangelove

Jan Kallberg, PhD - Cyberdefense.com - cyber defense, cyber operations, cyber security, national security

Publications - Jan Kallberg - cyber defense - cyberoperations - publications peer-review papers

How the Great Firewall of China Works [INFOGRAPHIC]

via www.techinasia.com

The Strange Beauty of Historic Computers Brought Back From the Dead | Wired Enterprise | Wired.com

When you open the door and walk into the room, it even smells like the 1960s. It reminds you of the old garage where your grandfather kept his twin Chevrolet Corvairs. But those aren't cars you smell. Those are computers.

This is the "1401 Room" on the first floor of the Computer History Museum in Mountain View, California — the room where Robert Garner and his motley crew of amateur technicians have spent the last decade reviving two of the massive IBM 1401 mainframe computers that littered the business world throughout the '60s and on into '70s.

via www.wired.com

Jan Kallberg, PhD - Cyberdefense.com - cyber defense, cyber operations, cyber security, national security

My research is focused mainly on cyber operations and national security. I have been published (or is accepted) in Joint Forces Quarterly, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Air and Space Power Journal, Military Review, Terrorism and political Violence, IEEE IT-Professional and IEEE Security & Privacy.

via www.utdallas.edu

I created my new personal website at UTD

Conflict and Cooperation in Cyberspace: The Challenge to National Security (Hardback) - Taylor & Francis

Conflict and Cooperation in Cyberspace

The Challenge to National Security

Edited by Panayotis A Yannakogeorgos, Adam B Lowther

To Be Published August 1st 2013 by Taylor & Francis – 304 pages

• Recommend to Librarian

Purchasing Options:

• Hardback: 978-1-46-659201-8: $59.95 Add to Cart
• eBook: 978-1-46-659202-5:
  Not Yet Available

• Description
• Contents
• Subjects

Description

With the recent inclusion of cyberspace as an operational domain by the DoD, the case could be made that it is far too specialized an area to be rolled up into the current branches of service. This book investigates the concept of cyber power in the 21st century, what it means to wield it, and how this capability may be used to wage war. It argues that cyberspace as a domain should be treated no differently than the traditional war fighting domains; that it, too, is an arena where defense may best be secured by attacking the enemy.

Contents

Introduction

KEY CONSIDERATIONS

The Future of Things Cyber; General Michael V. Hayden (Ret.)

What’s Wrong with Cyberspace?; Lynn Mattice

Cyberspace Security Considerations; Fred Taylor and Jerry Carter

Two, Maybe Three Cheers for Ambiguity; Martin Libicki

The Essential Features of an Ontology for Cyber Warfare; Randall Dipert

Cyber Defense as Environmental Protection: The Broader Potential Impact of Failed Defensive Counter Cyber Operations; Jan Kallberg and Rosemary Burk

via www.taylorandfrancis.com

Michael Hayden on National Security in the Digital Age - C-SPAN Video Library

Michael Hayden on National Security in the Digital Age - C-SPAN Video Library

Offensive Cyber: Superiority or Stuck in Legal Hurdles? | Defense News | defensenews.com

Academics who question the legality of offensive counter cyber operations often have limited technical understanding of the unique characteristics of cyberspace. The theoretical framework for an emerging cyber law under development by the legal community uses analogies from international law, such as the laws of the high seas and international commercial air treaties. But these are highly inappropriate for the cyber domain.

For example, the vast majority of these academic legal scholars would require the United States ensure that malicious software attack only combatant systems and legitimate military targets, and not affect any other systems.

What these requirements ignore is the issue of control. Those digital bits easily can be copied and distributed, and targeting removed or redesigned. How can a coder control the duplication of the code?

While code can be targeted to a specific military system, that is no guarantee it will be limited because of the dual use of information technology. There is no control of the code once it is released.

The legal perception of cyber is based on an assumption that actors are either civilian or military, but there is no such clear distinction in the militarized and contested digital world. It is digital bits; in the same way that we cannot distinguish military air and civilian air. It is just air.

In cyberspace, universities, municipal utilities, communication companies and other actors are a part of the war-fighting effort without clear boundaries to being civilian or military. If the U.S. became engaged in a cyber conflict with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, an organization that is a mix of crude arms manufacturing, terrorism training and soup kitchens for the poor, there is no way to ensure that a counter cyber attack would not affect the soup kitchens.

via www.defensenews.com

I think I have a valid point.

Offensive Cyber: Superiority or Stuck in Legal Hurdles? | Defense News | defensenews.com

interest from the non-Defense Department academic legal community, prompting numerous articles seeking to create a legal theory for cyber conflicts. Naturally, cyber operations should be used in an ethical way, but the hurdles generated by the legal community are staggering.

At a time when the United States has already lost an estimated $4 trillion in intellectual property as a result of foreign cyber espionage, not to mention the loss of military advantage, focusing on what the United States cannot do in cyberspace only hinders efforts to defend the country from future cyber attack. The country is facing an enemy unrestrained by limitations, clearly visible in blatant cyber attacks on military networks, major banks and media outlets.

Academics who question the legality of offensive counter cyber operations often have limited technical understanding of the unique characteristics of cyberspace. The theoretical framework for an emerging cyber law under development by the legal community uses analogies from international law, such as the laws of the high seas and international commercial air treaties. But these are highly inappropriate for the cyber domain.

via www.defensenews.com

Cyber strikes would require Obama's approval under policy being developed -- Defense Systems

U.S. President Barack Obama would have the authority to order a pre-emptive strike if the United States detects credible evidence of a major cyberattack being prepared against the nation from overseas under new policy being developed by the administration, reports the New York Times.

Officials involved in a secret legal review of existing powers of the U.S. president in relation to cyberattacks have confirmed that authority, the story said. The rules are being developed as part of that review will be classified.

via defensesystems.com

Publications - Jan Kallberg - cyber defense - cyberoperations - publications peer-review papers

2012. Kallberg, Jan. Designer satellite collisions from covert cyber war. Strategic Studies Quarterly. Spring.

2012. Lowther, Adam, and Jan Kallberg. Analysis - Toward a new American military. Atlantisch Perspectief - Opinieblad over Veiligheidszaken en Internationale Betrekkingen 36, no. 6 (2012): 10.

2012. Kallberg, Jan. Common Criteria meets realpolitik – Trust, alliances, and potential betrayal. IEEE Security and Privacy. February (online), July (print).

2012. Kallberg, Jan, and Bhavani Thuraisingham. Towards cyber operations - The new role of academic cyber security research and education. IEEE Intelligence and Security Informatics ISI 2012, Washington D.C., 11-14 June 2012 – Proceedings and papers published by IEEE Press.

2012. Kallberg, Jan. USA:s försvarsdoktrin efter kriget mot terrorismen. (Translation: U.S. defense doctrine after the War on Terrorism). Vårt Försvar (Translation: Our Defense). Vol.123:2.

2012. Kallberg, Jan, and Rosemary Burk. Online accountability and transparency in sustainable green business. Sustainability – The Journal of Record. April.

2012. Burk, Rosemary, and Jan Kallberg. Right of capture and urban sprawl – A potential federal financial risk in groundwater-dependent areas. International Journal of Water Resource Development. May.

2012. Kallberg, Jan. Balancing the budget – submarines in the era of austerity. Submarine Review. January 2012.

Articles in policy journals 2012 -  

2013. Lowther, Adam, and Jan Kallberg. Nuclear deterrence in a second Obama term. World Defence Systems. King's College UK (forthcoming)

2012. Kallberg, Jan, and Adam Lowther. The return of Dr. Strangelove: How fiscal austerity will push the United States towards nuclear arms and cyber-warfare. The Diplomat, August 20.

via www.cyberdefense.com

I added more publication links on my website

Public administration: 30-year-old principles still apply | Federal Times | federaltimes.com

Dwight Waldo wrote "The Enterprise of Public Administration" in 1979 looking back on a long academic career, but also as a reflection about the future for public administration. Can a 30-year-old book be relevant? You bet.

Several of Waldo's comments are accurate about today's issues — debt crisis, e-government and trust in government.

The modern U.S. is established on a foundation of economic growth, abundance and consensus, but a new paradigm of scarcity, decay and conflict is increasing pressure on public administration.

via www.federaltimes.com

I wrote it in 2011 - but it still applies.

Publications - Jan Kallberg - cyberdefense - cyberoperations - recent published peer-review papers

Recent published or accepted peer-review papers 2012 -

2013. Kallberg, Jan and Bhavani Thuraisingham.  Cyber Operations – Bridging from Concept to Cyber Superiority. Joint Forces Quarterly 68. January 2013.

2013. Kallberg, Jan. Diseñando Colisiones de Satélites en la Guerra Cibernética Encubierta. Air and Space Power Journal (Spanish edition – January 2013).

2012. Kallberg, Jan. Designer satellite collisions from covert cyber war. Strategic Studies Quarterly. Spring.

2012. Lowther, Adam, and Jan Kallberg. Analysis - Toward a new American military. Atlantisch Perspectief - Opinieblad over Veiligheidszaken en Internationale Betrekkingen 36, no. 6 (2012): 10.

via www.cyberdefense.com

I have started to update and provide links to my publications.

Designer Satellite Collisions from Covert Cyber War

DECIPHERING AND DEFENDING THE EUROPEAN UNION’S NON-BINDING CODE OF CONDUCT FOR OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES JAMESON ROHRER*

I am cited in this article:

http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1386&context=djcil

Wordle for the latest manuscript I have written

Pentagon increasing its cybersecurity forces fivefold | Atlantic Council

From Ellen Nakashima, Washington Post:  The Pentagon has approved a major expansion of its cybersecurity force over the next several years, increasing its size more than fivefold to bolster the nation’s ability to defend critical computer systems and conduct offensive computer operations against foreign adversaries, according to U.S. officials.

The move, requested by the head of the Defense Department’s Cyber Command, is part of an effort to turn an organization that has focused largely on defensive measures into the equivalent of an Internet-era fighting force. The command, made up of about 900 personnel, will expand to include 4,900 troops and civilians.

Details of the plan have not been finalized, but the decision to expand the Cyber Command was made by senior Pentagon officials late last year in recognition of a growing threat in cyberspace, said officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the expansion has not been formally announced. The gravity of that threat, they said, has been highlighted by a string of sabotage attacks, including one in which a virus was used to wipe data from more than 30,000 computers at a Saudi Arabian state oil company last summer.

via www.acus.org

Pentagon to Beef Up Cybersecurity Force to Counter Attacks - NYTimes.com

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon is moving toward a major expansion of its cybersecurity force to counter increasing attacks on the nation’s computer networks, as well as to expand offensive computer operations on foreign adversaries, defense officials said Sunday.

via www.nytimes.com

FBI is increasing pressure on suspects in Stuxnet inquiry - The Washington Post

Federal investigators looking into disclosures of classified information about a cyberoperation that targeted Iran’s nuclear program have increased pressure on current and former senior government officials suspected of involvement, according to people familiar with the investigation.

The inquiry, which was started by Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. last June, is examining leaks about a computer virus developed jointly by the United States and Israel that damaged nuclear centrifuges at Iran’s primary uranium enrichment plant. The U.S. code name for the operation was Olympic Games, but the wider world knew the mysterious computer worm as Stuxnet.

via www.washingtonpost.com

U.S. Air Force: Building the Air Power America Needs

Executive Summary

Much of what is written today about the capabilities required by the military services is offered within the context of fiscal restraint, national budget austerity, and cuts in the defense budget to ensure that the armed services pay their “fair” share of deficit reduction. This study argues for building an Air Force to support a joint force that can meet current and future threats to American security without regard for arbitrary fiscal guidelines and ceilings. It is time for the United States to adopt an asymmetric strategy linking objectives and resources, emphasizing the role of air power, and maximizing U.S. Air Force contributions to that strategy.

via www.heritage.org

My SSQ article is one of the references....